India-China | Signs of a thaw

On Sept. 13, NSA Ajit Doval met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. Both sides resolved to work for "complete disengagement" in Ladakh

ISSUE DATE: Sep 30, 2024

After two years of frozen relations between India and China, there seems to be indications of a defrost. On September 13, when National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of a BRICS (Brazil- Russia-India-China-South Africa) meeting in St Petersburg, Russia, both sides agreed to expedite “complete disengagement” on the remaining friction points along the border, where Chinese and Indian armies have been engaged in a protracted stand-off since May 2020. On the same day, highlighting progress in India-China talks, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar acknowledged that “75 per cent” of the “disengagement problems” have been resolved. Some see the use of the term “complete disengagement” as significant in that the stage is being set for a resumption of high-level political dialogue between the two nations, as military and diplomatic talks seem to have reached their limit. It’s now up to the top political leadership to push the issue towards a satisfactory resolution, they say. Overall, the hopeful messaging from Wang, Doval and Jaishankar is seen as preparatory to three potentially key diplomatic moments—a meeting at the ongoing 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), and two more mega events—the BRICS summit in Kazan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Islamabad—both in October.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in New York to attend the UNGA before it winds down on September 24; so will Chinese president Xi Jinping. Modi and Xi will again share the spotlight at the BRICS summit (Oct. 22-24). Though Pakistan has invited Modi for the SCO summit, it is unclear if he will attend NSA Doval and foreign minister Wang, who met at a conclave of national security advisors of BRICS nations, are also special representatives for the India-China border talks mechanism. In its press release after the meeting, India stated that “peace and tranquility in border areas and respect for the LAC are essential for normalcy in bilateral relations”, and called for adherence to past agreements. The Chinese foreign ministry statement, albeit in a more non-committal vein, hit those same notes: “The two sides discussed the progress made in the recent consultations on border affairs and believed that the stability of China-India relations is in the fundamental and long-term interests of the two peoples and conducive to regional peace and development.” The two sides, it added, must strive “to enhance mutual understanding and trust and create conditions for the improvement of bilateral relationsâ€æ.” It creates the space for mutuality while making visible a divergence in approach— India seeking clear, actionable steps to end the standoff and China leaving room for manoeuvre without fully grappling with the dispute.

On September 13, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning added more substance: “In recent years, frontline armies of the two countries have realised disengagement in four areas in the western sector of the China-India border, including the Galwan Valley. The China-India border situation is generally stable and under control.” This was a day after Jaishankar had made his “75 per cent” comments at an interactive session at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He said the Galwan Valley clashes of June 2020 affected the “entirety” of India- China ties. This reiterated India’s old stand—that one cannot have violence at the border and then say the rest of the relationship is insulated from it.

So far, 21 rounds of corps commander- level talks have taken place between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army, most recently in February 2024. Alongside it, on the diplomatic front, there have been 31 rounds of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), the latest being in Beijing on August 29. The most recent disengagement in the Ladakh sector was in September 2022 at Gogra-Hot Springs, following earlier pullbacks at PP-14, PP- 17A and Pangong Tso. However, the core issues at Depsang and Demchok remain unresolved, with India taking a stand that these should be sorted out before Beijing-New Delhi ties are normalised.

According to a military observer, Jaishankar’s comment that “75 per cent” of the LAC issues have been “sorted out” gives a false impression. “It means we have accepted those buffer zones where we used to earlier go on patrols and which were created (at points of disengagement) to prevent clashes,” he says, adding that the situation also left open the threat of a resumption of tension due to the massive troop deployment and infrastructure build-up by both sides. “The trust deficit persists. Buffer zones may help avoid physical clashes, but until both sides return to their pre-2020 positions, disengagement is only a stopgap measure,” says Lt Gen. Rakesh Sharma (retd), former commander of Leh-based 14 (Fire and Fury) Corps. He adds that the process must go beyond mere disengagement— denoting a halt in action—to actual de-induction before the situation can truly be considered normal.

In July 2020, after the clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, a 3 km (about 1.5 km on both sides) demilitarised buffer zone was created. Similarly, in February 2021, India and China agreed to have an 8 km buffer zone between Finger 3 and Finger 8 on India’s side of the LAC on Pangong Tso lake (northern bank), with a moratorium on patrolling by both sides. Similar zones were created in Gogra-Hot Springs. However, not much success has been achieved in the past two years on further disengagement/ disarmament along the LAC by the two sides.

“There has been some progress at diplomatic levelsâ€æthere is possibility of further rapprochement even on the LAC at Depsang and Demchok. But that doesn’t rule out the Chinese attempting an incursion in other areas, like they did at Yangtse (in Arunachal Pradesh, in December 2022), or they might try to infringe into the buffer areas,” warns Lt Gen. Sharma.

Since 2020, Indian and Chinese militaries have beefed up their presence in Ladakh. In retaliation to large-scale infrastructure development by the Chinese near the LAC, India has accelerated its own process of building roads, bridges and airfields for faster deployment of men and materiel. Recently, satellite pictures revealed that the Chinese military has constructed helipads close to the LAC. Their proximity to areas like Depsang and Gogra indicates a strategic focus on rapid deployment. Additionally, underground bunkers and expanded air bases signal preparations for long-term presence in the contested Aksai Chin. For example, 10 Chinese helistrips have come up opposite Daulat Beg Oldie, India’s northernmost corner, near Aksai Chin.

Though high-ranking officials of both countries have struck optimistic notes, only Modi and Xi can, through their personal efforts, dispel the lingering trust deficit and complete the unfinished business on the LAC.