In Deciding Whether to Retaliate, Iran Faces a Dilemma

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In Deciding Whether to Retaliate, Iran Faces a Dilemma

If Iran strikes back at Israel, it risks further escalation at a time when its economy is struggling and its military is vulnerable. If it doesn’t, it risks looking weak.

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By Steven Erlanger

Steven Erlanger, a former Jerusalem bureau chief, also covered the Islamic Revolution and has written about the region for many years.

Iran faces a dilemma after the Israeli strikes on Saturday.

If it retaliates, it risks further escalation at a time when its economy is struggling, its allies are faltering, its military vulnerability is clear and its leadership succession is in play.

If it does not, it risks looking weak to those same allies, as well as to more aggressive and powerful voices at home.

Iran is already in the middle of a regional war. Since the Hamas-led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has moved swiftly to damage the militant group in Gaza and other Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and its allies in Syria and Iraq.

These groups represent Iran’s “forward defense” against Israel, the heart of the nation’s deterrence. They have been badly weakened by the Israeli military’s tough response since Oct. 7, which weakens Iran, too, and makes it more vulnerable.

Iranian officials have made it clear that they do not want a direct war with Israel. They want to preserve their allies, the so-called ring of fire around Israel.

After Israel struck Iran, Tehran on Saturday publicly played down the effect of the attack and showed ordinary programming on television. It did not immediately vow a major retaliation, but simply restated its right to do so.

Adding to its reticence, Iran faces enormous economic problems, making it wary of an extended and costly war with Israel. It has been heavily penalized by the United States and Europe over its nuclear program, forcing it to move ever closer to Russia and China.

The Islamic regime is also dealing with serious domestic dissent over rising prices and its harsh rule, which play into any calculation for retaliation. The regime is both committed to the destruction of Israel, but also to preserving its power in a sophisticated country in which it is increasingly unpopular.

That is one reason, analysts believe, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, allowed the election of a more moderate president, Masoud Pezeshkian, after the harder-line Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash. Against the backdrop of domestic unrest, Mr. Pezeshkian has pushed for new talks on Iran’s nuclear program in return for a lifting of economic sanctions, outreach that most likely could take place only with the permission of the supreme leader.

The nuclear program is its own dilemma. The damage to allies over the past year, as well as its clear technical and military weakness compared with Israel, will put more pressure on Iran to advance its nuclear program and go for a bomb.

Iran is already within weeks of creating bomb-quality uranium, and there are strong voices in Iran arguing that the best deterrent against Israel and the United States is to have nuclear weapons, as Israel itself possesses. But Iran also knows that a series of American presidents — including Donald J. Trump, who is running neck and neck against Vice President Kamala Harris in the U.S. presidential race — have vowed to prevent Iran from attaining an operational nuclear weapon.

Complicating matters, a quiet battle has emerged over succession. Ayatollah Khamenei, 85, is believed to be seriously ill. With Mr. Raisi gone, there is internal disquiet over the possibility that Ayatollah Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba, 55, might succeed him. The powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will have an important say and is considered more willing to confront Israel.

Whatever Iran’s ultimate calculation, hoping to avoid a larger war does not mean it can.

Both Israel and Iran are eager to restore the so-called deterrence effect that they believe comes with retaliatory strikes. As they see it, it enhances their ability to intimidate each other and allows them to limit each other’s power, in what Jeremy Shapiro, a former American diplomat, has called their “geopolitical manhood.”

This past week, as might be expected, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said that “in the event of an Israeli attack, the shape of our response will be proportionate and calculated.”

These back-and-forth attacks, however carefully calibrated, can easily spill over into wider violence if a hospital or a school is hit, even by accident, and causes significant civilian casualties.

As Daniel C. Kurtzer and Aaron David Miller wrote this week in Foreign Policy, “a spiraling tit for tat would likely prompt the Israelis to expand their target set, at a minimum, to include economic infrastructure.” From there, they added, “it’s certainly possible to imagine a regional escalation, including Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.”

But Iran may also choose to heed American and British advice to call an end to this round of retaliations as negotiations for cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon gather pace.

Ali Vaez, the Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, said on X that Israel’s response was “considerably more robust” than the one in April.

Israel struck Iranian air defenses and missile manufacturing sites in three provinces, while also attacking targets in Iraq and Syria, according to Israel officials. But it avoided key infrastructure, energy and nuclear sites.

The key question, Mr. Vaez said, was simple: “Whether Tehran will absorb the hit and try to draw a line under this exchange or up the ante again with a counter-response.”

For Iran, the argument for climbing down the escalatory ladder is a strong one. But there are powerful voices like the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which regularly press for a more aggressive response.

The desire for Washington and Israel, too, is that the conflict with Iran “becomes once again a shadow war and not an overt war,” said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “In today’s world that would be an achievement. You don’t end the enmity but bring it under control.”

Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East Program at Chatham House, said that the U.S. presidential election in November is also a factor. “If Iran wants to avoid a broader escalatory conflict in advance of the uncertain U.S. election, it must take the hit and play a longer strategic game focused on diplomatic outreach to the region and openings should they emerge from the West,” she said.

By playing down the effect of the strike and pressing for a cease-fire, she said, “Iran will try to turn the tables on Israel and translate its military weakness into diplomatic openings.”