Opinion – Yahya Sinwar killed: Can Israel win the war by eliminating top leadership?

Israeli forces eliminated Hamas Chief and military leader Yahya Sinwar in a gunfight on October 16. Could Israel win the war with such targeted killings of top Hamas leadership?

On October 16, in yet another major tactical victory in the ongoing war in Gaza, Israeli forces eliminated Hamas Chief and military leader Yahya Sinwar in a gunfight. In the past year, especially since July 30, this year, the killing of top Hamas or Hezbollah leaders has become the go-to option for Israel to put the opposing forces under pressure. The pager and walkie-talkie blasts on Hezbollah in Lebanon followed by the targeted assassination of its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah have been the key talking points in the war.

However, these targeted killings are not a recent phenomenon. As a part of its war strategy, Israel has put in huge intelligence resources to track key Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and take them out at an opportune moment. Three months into the war, on December 25 last year, Sayyed Razi Mousavi, Iran’s most influential military commander in the Levant, was killed in a suspected Israeli airstrike in Syria’s capital Damascus. Mousavi, a Quds Force General, was the most senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander killed since the assassination of commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

On January 2, Hamas’s deputy leader abroad Saleh al-Arouri, the leader of its military wing in the West Bank, was killed in an Israeli strike in Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. On January 4, a suspected US drone attack killed Mushtaq Talib Al-Saidi, deputy commander of operations in the Iraqi capital for Harakat Al-Nujaba, a pro-Iran militia group. The next major targeted assassination came on April 1, when an Israeli air strike targeted the Iranian Consulate in Damascus, resulting in the death of General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the senior most IRGC commander in Lebanon and Syria.

But, the night of July 30, the day when the new president of Iran was sworn in, has to count as the deadliest — the assassination of the Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in a targeted strike at his residence in a closely guarded area in Tehran. In Beirut, a precision strike from the air took out a senior Hezbollah military commander, Fuad Shukr. On the same night, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh of the IRGC Aerospace Forces of Iran was assassinated too. Later, in September, in a series of targeted assassinations, Israel eliminated at least three tiers of Hezbollah’s top leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah on August 27.

Is this strategy working?

There is no doubt that the assassination of top leaders is demoralising for the cadre. In Hezbollah’s case especially, the targeted elimination of its entire leadership coupled with the destruction of its communication network through the pagers attacks was a severe body blow. Taking advantage of it, Israeli forces decided to launch ground operations into Lebanon to make conditions conducive for Israeli settlers to return to northern Israel. There was a clear understanding in Israel that its forces should drive home the tactical advantage before Hezbollah could regroup.

However, Israeli forces have not only been halted but have suffered major casualties to personnel and weapon platforms like the famous Merkava armoured tanks. Plus, the ferocity and reach of rocket and missile attacks from Hezbollah have intensified to a large extent inflicting losses to Israel in Haifa, Kiryat Shmona, Acre, and even Tel Aviv. On the Gaza front too, despite the killing of top leaders, the resistance continues with daily encounters with Israeli forces, inflicting losses and the stated aim of “eliminating Hamas from the face of the earth” is nowhere close.

This strategy is also working against Israel. Firstly, it is enabling Iran and its proxies to cry foul and rally support of additional cadres in the fight. Secondly, for Israel, which is already under immense international pressure for indiscriminate killings of civilians in the war, such targeted killings, especially on foreign soil are pushing more and more countries to be vocal against it and reluctantly support Iran and its allies.

Have targeted killings ever helped?

The most prominent example has to be Afghanistan. After “bombing Afghanistan into the Stone Age” and killing Osama bin Laden through a targeted operation on foreign soil, did the US succeed in liberating Afghanistan from Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Clearly not. In fact, the US had to beat a hasty retreat in August 2021, leaving Afghanistan in the hands of the latter, in a situation worse than what existed in September 2001, when it had launched the “Global War on Terror”. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda has spread far and wide into the region and even Africa, mushrooming into different forms and names.

The war in Iraq and the subsequent execution of Saddam Hussein has to be another case study in this context. Did the war or the elimination of the top leadership in Iraq result in peace and stability? The answer again is no. In the past two decades since the war, Iraq has not been able to stabilise, has been prone to regular internal and external security threats, including from ISIS, and has become a key ally of Iran, much to the dismay of the US and Israel.

What about Libya? Did the act of dragging Gaddafi out of a hole in the desert and killing him help stabilise Libya? No. Unlike many other countries in the region which were struck by the Arab Spring protests in 2010-11, Libya continues to remain unstable with no clear leadership and direction.

What should be done?

Whether against conventional forces or militias and proxies, war can only be won by clearly stated and achievable military objectives and political goals. Israel, in the past, has been a master of this craft and has therefore successfully fought and ended conflicts in the region, through short and swift wars.

However, this time, more out of outrage and embarrassment, the war objectives set out are unrealistic and quite unachievable. Israel’s generals as well as key members of the war cabinet have voiced concerns over them too. On June 9, Former general and leader of Israel’s National Unity party Benny Gantz resigned from the war cabinet, citing differences in objectives and the failure of the war cabinet to agree on a plan for Gaza beyond the current war. Soon after, on June 19, Israel’s Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari told Israel’s Channel 13 broadcaster that “this business of destroying Hamas, making Hamas disappear — it’s simply throwing sand in the eyes of the public.”

Also, against militias and groups like Hamas and Hezbollah who are born out of an ideology based on suppression of people, such assassinations only fuel more anger and hatred and strengthen their collective resolve to fight harder. Remember, these groups and the people they represent are fighting for existence with their backs to the wall and therefore have nothing to lose. Plus, such incidents give the perfect fodder to their mentors like Iran to take the fight one notch further, making the resolution of conflict and ceasefire that much more difficult.

Israel would have to review whether targeted assassinations are making a meaningful impact on the achievement of its stated war objectives. Yes, every assassination of a top Hamas, Hezbollah, or IRGC leader is seen as a political victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, do such assassinations make the task of getting back hostages easier? Also, in the absence of established and experienced top leadership, the next level of leadership is generally more aggressive and less prone to rational discussions about ending the war and negotiations like the return of hostages.

Israel may therefore do well to review its war objectives, make them more sharp and achievable, and seek an end to the war while it can still drive the agenda. Targeted killings of top leadership cannot be a part of such war objectives. Sometimes, tactical victories like this turn into strategic losses over the long run.

(Colonel Rajeev Agarwal is a military veteran and West Asia expert. During his service, he has been the Director of Military Intelligence and Director of the Ministry of External Affairs)

(Views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author)